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Abstract
Cooperation is observed widely in nature and is thought an
essential component of many evolutionary processes, yet the
mechanisms by which it arises and persists are still unclear.
Among several theories, network reciprocity — a model of
inhomogeneous social interactions — has been proposed as
an enabling mechanism to explain the emergence of coopera-
tion. Existing evolutionary models of this mechanism have
tended to focus on highly heterogeneous (scale-free) net-
works, hence typically assume preferential attachment mech-
anisms, and consequently the prerequisite that individuals
have global network knowledge. Within an evolutionary
game theoretic context, using the weak prisoner’s dilemma
as a metaphor for cooperation, we present a minimal model
which describes network growth by chronological random
addition of new nodes, combined with regular attrition of less
fit members of the population. Specifically our model does
not require that agents have access to global information and
does not assume scale-free network structure or a preferential
attachment mechanism. Further our model supports the emer-
gence of cooperation from initially non-cooperative popula-
tions. By reducing dependency on a number of assumptions,
this model offers broad applicability and as such may support
an explanation of the emergence of cooperation in early evo-
lutionary transitions, where few assumptions can be made.
Introduction
Cooperation is widespread within the natural world and con-
sidered to be important in evolutionary processes, particu-
larly in situations where complexity increases, such as early
evolutionary transitions, symbiogenesis, or the formation of
multicellular organisms (Smith and Szathmary, 1997). A
variety of enabling mechanisms have been proposed to ex-
plain the emergence and persistence of cooperation (Nowak,
2006), although some of these rely on certain assumptions or
constraints being satisfied (e.g. familial relatedness of indi-
viduals, or the existence of higher cognitive processes).
Among these enabling mechanisms, network reciprocity
describes how reciprocal behaviour can be promoted by the
form of the connectivity between members of a population.
This mechanism appears less demanding in terms of specific
assumptions and so potentially offers a more general expla-
nation: most organisms exist within some form of network.
A large body of research has been developed which is fo-
cused on understanding network reciprocity. Evolutionary
game theory has in particular become a common approach
to such investigations, routinely with the use of the single-
parameter weak prisoner’s dilemma (Nowak and May, 1992)
as a metaphor for cooperation.
The importance of spatial structure in explaining coopera-
tion was first highlighted in (Nowak and May, 1992). These
findings were notably developed with regards to heteroge-
neous networks in (Santos and Pacheco, 2005, 2006), where
it was shown that static heterogeneous networks promote co-
operation. Heterogeneity, in network topology, refers to the
range of degree values in a network, where degree k repre-
sents the number of edges or connections a node may have.
In a homogeneously structured network every node has the
same value of k. A scale-free (SF) network is considered to
have high heterogeneity and has k values distributed accord-
ing to a power law. Scale-free networks are often assumed
to be the result of preferential attachment (PA) processes
(also referred to as ‘the rich get richer’ or the ‘Matthew ef-
fect’ (Merton, 1968)). A key finding in (Santos and Pacheco,
2005) is that scale-free networks (high structural hetero-
geneity), result in higher levels of cooperation than random
networks (low heterogenity). Given that many naturally-
occurring networks are considered to have a scale-free struc-
ture and hence a power-law degree distribution (Baraba´si
and Albert, 1999; Baraba´si and Bonabeau, 2003) such find-
ings regarding network heterogeneity and cooperation have
naturally generated much interest.
In a particularly interesting work (Poncela et al., 2008),
cooperation in dynamic scale-free networks is demonstrated
using a coevolutionary model where a preferential attach-
ment (PA) mechanism for network growth is linked to the
evolutionary success of evolving agents within a network. A
typical PA system involves attachment of newcomers pref-
erentially to those existing individuals which have more net-
work connections. The evolutionary preferential attachment
(EPA) model differs from such an approach in that it de-
scribes a process where newcomers are more likely to attach
to fitter members of the existing population. Prior to this
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work, studies of cooperation in networks had focused on the
effect that the network had upon the population. The EPA
model specifically adds a causal relationship in the reverse
direction, whereby agent behaviour impacts network struc-
ture, and hence also offering the possibility of a feedback
mechanism.
We recently illustrated that an EPA approach, which
additionally incorporates population size fluctuation, sup-
ports cooperation, specifically enabling its emergence from
initially non-cooperative founder networks (Miller and
Knowles, 2014). Whilst other models within the literature
have investigated pruning of networks by means of link dele-
tion (Zimmermann and Eguı´luz, 2005; Santos et al., 2006;
Pacheco et al., 2006; Traulsen et al., 2009) or to a lesser
extent node deletion (Perc, 2009; Szolnoki et al., 2009;
Ichinose et al., 2013), our approach specifically differed
from these works in that we deleted nodes on the basis of
(least) fitness, thus presenting an evolutionarily representa-
tive method of population attrition.
Within this report we extend our previous findings, to de-
velop a minimal model for cooperation in networks which
shifts the evolutionary focus from the network growth mech-
anism to the node deletion process. We demonstrate how
such a shift reduces dependency on initial population con-
ditions and also on scale-free network heterogeneity. In the
following sections, we first revisit the two key elements of
network reciprocity to illustrate how such a shift can still
support cooperation; we subsequently expand on the neces-
sity for a minimal model.
Two elements of network reciprocity
Network reciprocity is often explained with reference to het-
erogeneity. However the promotion of cooperation observed
in the foundational work of (Nowak and May, 1992) is due
to assortativity of agent strategies (on a homogeneous lattice
structure) which results in grouping of cooperators.
Figure 1 presents three identically structured example net-
works, which feature identical numbers of cooperators and
defectors, in order to illustrate how assortativity can pro-
mote or suppress cooperation in the absence of heterogene-
ity. These example networks can also be viewed as represen-
tative samples of larger networks with homogeneous degree
distribution, in which every node has k = 4. We extrapolate
mean scores (indicated with ‘−→’) for such larger networks
which eliminate the edge effects present in the figures.
Figure 1a, represents a homogeneous (evenly mixed) dis-
tribution of strategies, where each node connects to two
defectors and two cooperators. Defectors outcompete co-
operators in this distribution. Figure 1b shows a non-
homogeneous (disassortative) strategy distribution where
each agent connects to nonself-similar strategies. In this
case the total population score is greater than in Figure 1a,
however this strategy distribution results in scores of zero
for all cooperators, and positive scores for defectors. Fig-
ure 1c illustrates a non-homogeneous (assortative) strategy
distribution which shows how self-similar grouping benefits
cooperators but not defectors.
Total8C8score8=812
Total8D8score8=824
Total8pop,8score8=836
Mean8C8score888888882
Mean8D8score888888884
a)8Evenly8mixed
Total8C8score8=820
Total8D8payoff8=88
Total8pop,8score8=828
Mean8C8score8888888884
Mean8D8score8888888880
c)8Assortative8mixing
Total8C8score8=80
Total8D8score8=848
Total8pop,8score8=848
Mean8C8score8888888880
Mean8D8score8888888888
b)8Disassortative8mixing
4 4 4 4
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
0 8 0 6
4 0 6 0
0 6 0 4
6 0 8 0
2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0
2 3 3 2
2 3 3 2
Parameters:
N8=816
Nc =8 ND8=88
b = 2
Payoffs:
C-C8:81,1
C-D8:80,b
D-D8:80,0
Figure 1: Sample networks illustrating how identical ho-
mogeneous network structures can support cooperation to
differing extents given differing strategy distributions. Blue
circles represent cooperator nodes. Red triangles represent
defector nodes. Black lines represent edges (interactions)
between nodes. The values within the nodes represent the
scores (sum of individual edge payoffs) for the nodes. For
illustrative purposes we have selected an arbitrary value of
b = 2 to calculate example values for the scores.
From these examples, we see that, on a homogeneous spa-
tial structure, given an ability of strategies to redistribute
themselves, it is possible for cooperators to improve their
lot as a result of self-assorting. Such behaviour allows co-
operators to achieve higher scores than would be achieved
for random or evenly mixed strategy distributions. From an
evolutionary perspective, where scores represent fitness, it
is easy to see how self-assortment may allow cooperators to
outcompete defectors in a network. It should be noted that
defectors do not benefit from self-assorting. (Both strategies
benefit from connecting to cooperators and so defectors can
therefore only benefit from ‘nonself-assorting’ behaviour.)
In the work of (Santos et al., 2006) which looks at
the effect of heterogeneously (rather than homogeneously)
structured networks, the mechanism of assortativity illus-
trated above supports the formation of groups of coopera-
tors, whilst the greater connectivity that can be found be-
tween some individuals in heterogeneous networks offers
increased rewards to cooperators in groups. Such models
combine the two elements we refer to in this section: Het-
erogeneity further increases the potential gains that can be
made by self-assortativity.
The volume of scientific literature on the role of hetero-
geneous networks in cooperation combined with the preva-
lence of such networks in the real world, tend to leave strat-
egy assortativity as a somewhat marginalised topic. It is
worth highlighting that, regardless of the heterogeneity (or
lack of) in the network, cooperation cannot emerge with-
out some form of redistribution process that supports group-
ing of cooperators: Assortativity remains the essential un-
derpinning requirement for spatially structured reciprocity.
In this paper we investigate a model for the emergence of
cooperation in dynamic networks of evolving agents. Our
model makes few demands regarding the specifics of net-
work structure (and associated mechanisms of network for-
mation), whilst still promoting assortativity. We explore the
rationale to produce such a model in the following section.
A minimal model
The EPA model (Poncela et al., 2008) introduced earlier has
been proposed as a possible explanation for the evolution-
ary origins of cooperation. The model uses a mechanism
for network growth whereby new agents (nodes) added to a
network preferentially attach to fitter nodes. The probability
that an existing node i receives one of the m new edges is as
follows:
Π(t) =
1− + fi(t)∑N(t)
j=1 (1− + fj(t))
, (1)
where fi(t) is the fitness of an existing node i and N(t) is
the number of nodes available to connect to at time t in the
existing population. The parameter  ∈ [0, 1) is used to ad-
just selection pressure. (A fuller explanation of the details
of the EPA implementation is provided in the methods sec-
tion.) Inspection of Equation 1 highlights that in order for
a newcomer to “decide” which node to connect to, it is re-
quired to have “global” information regarding i) the fitness
of all other individuals in the population, and ii) the size of
the population, both of which are unlikely to be satisfiable
in real world examples.
Given the preferential attachment mechanism, the EPA
model is expected to generate a scale-free network (ibid.).
Visual assessment of degree distribution supports this hy-
pothesis for certain implementations i.e. for those b values
where cooperators form the majority strategy.
The scale-free property observed in PA network models
parallels many empirical findings in real networks (Baraba´si
and Bonabeau, 2003), however whilst many real networks
have been proposed to be scale-free (on the basis of apparent
power-law degree distributions), Clauset et al. (2009) have
highlighted that such claims are often hypothesised rather
than demonstrated. Complex networks are difficult to char-
acterise with certainty (accurately distinguishing power-law
distributions from e.g. stretched exponentials is a non-trivial
problem) and previous claims of scale-free characteristics in
real networks have subsequently been challenged (Amaral
et al., 2000; Doyle et al., 2005; Tanaka, 2005). A claim that a
network is scale-free is plausible if a preferential attachment
process is known to have generated the network, however
in the absence of such knowledge, assumptions of scale-free
topology may be unreliable. Network models that presup-
pose scale-free heterogeneity in order to explain coopera-
tion are therefore potentially constrained by such assump-
tions. We also note that whilst preferential attachment mod-
els generate scale-free networks, the converse does not nec-
essarily hold, i.e. while power-law distributions may arise as
the result of preferential attachment; other approaches can
also generate such distributions (Miller, 1957; Albert and
Baraba´si, 2002; Caldarelli et al., 2002).
The application of simplified PA models to real world
situations is also impacted by the absence of a general ex-
planation addressing the underlying preferential attachment
mechanisms. Each novel situation requires its own explana-
tion. We consider, in particular, the question of how cooper-
ation emerged in early evolutionary transitions. In such sit-
uations, involving primitive life forms, which might be for
example, immobile, carried by currents and/or interacting
randomly, it is unclear whether a mechanism may have ex-
isted by which preferential attachment occurred. The ability
of fitter individuals to preferentially influence social struc-
ture (and hence drive the formation of scale-free networks)
cannot be generally assumed.
We now present a minimal model for cooperation in net-
works which does not require that agents have access to
global knowledge, does not depend on a preferential attach-
ment, does not require scale-free network structure, and also
does not define or imply feedback between agent behaviour
and the population structure.
Our model implements network growth by chronological
random attachment (CRA) of new nodes alongside a strategy
updating rule which defines agents’ evolutionary behaviour.
The network is grown by attaching new nodes randomly to
existing nodes within the network. We highlight that this
does not generate a typical random network (which would
have a Poisson degree distribution); instead the chronolog-
ical nature of the additions results in an exponential degree
distribution (Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002), with ‘older’
nodes being more highly connected. The evolutionary strat-
egy updating, which defines strategy assortment, drives the
displacement of less fit strategies by those of more success-
ful neighbours. This updating process takes place along-
side the growth of the network. For purposes of compari-
son, our model is based as closely as possible on the EPA
model. Strategy updating rules are identical; the node at-
tachment process differs. We also incorporate an additional
mechanism not present in the original EPA model: whereas
networks established by EPA are fixed in structure once the
network reaches a specified size, our model incorporates an
attrition process. In this process a certain proportion of less
fit members of the population are removed by tournament
selection whenever the network reaches a maximum size.
The details of EPA and CRA models are presented in the
methods section.
Methods
Overview. Our models and simulations are based on those
described in (Poncela et al., 2008), but with the addition, in
the case of attrition implementations, of a tournament selec-
tion step that removes nodes from the network. We here give
a full description of the approach for completeness.
The models consist of a network (i.e. graph) with agents
situated at the nodes. Edges between nodes represent inter-
actions between agents. Interactions are behaviours between
agents playing the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. These
behaviours are encoded by a ‘strategy’ variable which takes
one of two values: cooperate or defect. The game is played
in a round robin fashion, with each agent playing its strat-
egy against all its connected neighbours, in turn. Each agent
thus accumulates a fitness score which is the sum of all the
individual game payoffs.
Within an evolutionary simulation, starting from a found-
ing population, this process is repeated over generations.
The evolutionary process assesses agents at each generation
on the basis of their fitness score: Fitter agents’ strategies
remain unchanged; less fit agents are more likely to have
strategies replaced by those of fitter neighbours.
The evolutionary preferential attachment (EPA) model
connects strategy dynamics to network growth: starting
from a small founding population, newcomer nodes are
added which preferentially connect to fitter agents within
the network. Our chronological random attachment (CRA)
model uses the same founding population structures as EPA
but adds newcomer nodes to randomly selected existing
nodes.
Attrition implementations of both models add a further
component which repeatedly prunes the network: When-
ever the population reaches a maximum size, a specified
percentage of nodes in the network are removed, on the
basis of least fitness, after which the network grows again.
Outline of the evolutionary process. Unless stated other-
wise in the text, the general outline of the evolutionary pro-
cess we use is described, for one generation, as follows:
1. Play prisoner’s dilemma: Each agent plays one-shot pris-
oner’s dilemma with all neighbours and achieves a fitness
score that is the sum of all the payoffs.
2. Update strategies: Those strategies that achieve low
scores are replaced on a probabilistic basis by compari-
son with the strategies of randomly selected neighbours.
3. Grow network: A specified number of new nodes are
added to the network, connecting to m distinct existing
nodes via m edges using either EPA or CRA.
4. Remove nodes (only in the case of attrition models): If
the network has reached maximum size, it is pruned by a
tournament selection process that removes less fit agents.
In the following, we provide more detail on the specifics of
each of the four steps:
Play prisoner’s dilemma. We use the single parameter rep-
resentation of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma as formulated
in (Nowak and May, 1992). In this form (the ‘weak’ pris-
oner’s dilemma), payoff values for the actions, referred to as
T, R, P and S, become b, 1, 0 and 0 (see Figure 2). The b
parameter represents the ‘temptation to defect’ and is set at
a value greater than 1 for the dilemma to exist.
From the accumulated prisoner’s dilemma interactions,
each agent achieves a fitness score as follows:
fi =
ki∑
j=1
pii,j , (2)
where ki is the number of neighbours that node i has, j rep-
resents a connected neighbour and pii,j represents the payoff
achieved by node i from playing prisoner’s dilemma with
node j.
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Figure 2: Payoff matrix for weak prisoner’s dilemma.
Update strategies. Each node i selects a neighbour j at ran-
dom. If the fitness of node i, fi is greater or equal to the
neighbour’s fitness fj , then i’s strategy is unchanged. If the
fitness of node i, fi is less than the neighbour’s fitness, fj ,
then i’s strategy is replaced by a copy of the neighbour j’s
strategy, according to a probability proportional to the differ-
ence between their fitness values. Thus poor scoring nodes
have their strategies displaced by the strategies of more suc-
cessful neighbours.
More precisely, at generation t, if fi(t) ≥ fj(t) then i’s
strategy remains unchanged. If fi(t) < fj(t) then i’s strat-
egy is replaced with that of the neighbour j with the follow-
ing probability:
Pi =
fj(t)− fi(t)
b.max[ki(t), kj(t)]
, (3)
where ki and kj are degrees of node i and its neighbour
j respectively. The purpose of the denominator is to nor-
malise the difference between the two nodes. The expression
b.max[ki(t), kj(t)] represents the largest achievable fitness
difference between the two nodes given their respective de-
grees.
Grow network. New nodes, with randomly allocated strate-
gies, are added to achieve a total of 10 at each generation.
The probability that an existing node i receives one of the m
new edges was shown in Equation 1. Each new node uses
m edges to connect to existing nodes. In all our simulations,
we use m = 2 edges. Duplicate edges and self-edges are not
allowed.
Given that in our model each new node extends m = 2
new edges, and multiple edges are not allowed, N is there-
fore determined without replacement. The parameter  ∈
[0, 1) is used to adjust selection pressure. For all of our sim-
ulations  = 0.99, hence focusing our model on selection
occurring directly as a result of the preferential attachment
process.
In CRA implementations, new nodes connect to existing
nodes randomly. The probability that an existing node i re-
ceives one of the m new edges becomes simply:
Π(t) =
1
N(t)
. (4)
Remove nodes (in the case of attrition models). On
achieving a specified size, the network is pruned by a
percentage X. This is achieved by tournament selection
using a tournament size equivalent to 1% of the population.
The tournament members are selected randomly from the
population. The tournament member having the least fitness
is the ‘winner’. The remaining nodes are returned to the
population. By this method, a shortlist of X% nodes is
established for removal from the network. All edges from
deleted nodes are removed from the network. Any nodes
that become disconnected from the network as a result of
this process are also deleted. (Failure to do this would result
in small numbers of single, disconnected, non-playing
nodes, having static strategies, whose zero fitness values
would result in continual isolation from the network.)
When there are multiple nodes of equivalent low fitness
value, the selection is effectively random (on the basis that
the members were originally picked from the population
randomly). Where X = 0, no attrition occurs.
General simulation conditions. We investigated networks
grown from an initial complete network with N0 = 3 agents
at generation t0. Founding populations were either entirely
cooperators or entirely defectors. Networks were grown to
a maximum size of N = 1000 nodes with an overall aver-
age degree of approximately k = 4. Simulations were run
until 2000 generations. The ‘fraction of cooperators’ values
we use (denoted by 〈c〉) are means, averaged over the last
20 generations of each simulation, in order to compensate
for variability that might occur if just using final generation
values. Each simulation consisted of 10 replicates. We used
X = 2.5% for all simulations.
Results
We compared the effects of non-attrition vs. attrition (‘+’)
implementations of two models: i) chronological random
attachment (CRA and CRA+), and ii) evolutionary prefer-
ential attachment (EPA and EPA+).
How do preferential and random attachment affect the
models? In Figure 3 we show profiles of final levels of co-
operation, 〈c〉 vs. temptation to defect, b for the four im-
plementations. We note that whilst the preferential attach-
ment mechanism appeared (on the basis of log-log linear-
ity) to result in scale-free networks for those values of b
where cooperation is supported, it is hard in the light of
these results to argue that such scale-free networks necessar-
ily achieve higher levels of cooperation than those formed
by random node addition (which have exponential degree
distributions): Examining non-attrition implementations of
the models (solid lines), we see that in the case of networks
grown from cooperative founders, EPA results in higher lev-
els of cooperation than CRA. However, the same cannot be
said for populations grown from defectors where random at-
tachment results in higher levels of cooperation for values of
b < 1.3. Why does random attachment benefit cooperation
in defector-founded networks?
We attempt to answer this using Figure 4 where we il-
lustrate early node attachment to cooperator- and defector-
founded populations. In Figure 4a, the three coopera-
tor founders have their scores reinforced by their intercon-
nections (shown with bold lines). Added nodes (dashed
lines) differ in their scores by a factor of b depending on
whether they are cooperator or defector. Nodes added to
a cooperator-founded network will initially tend to have
scores (= m orm∗b) relatively similar to the founder nodes
(= 2 or 3), with precise values dependent on b. Figure 4b il-
lustrates that self-similarity within the founder network does
not benefit defectors in the same way that is seen for coop-
erators (D-D interactions results in payoffs of zero for both
individuals). Whilst this seems to be a weakness, defector-
founded networks have an alternative advantage: the ad-
dition of new nodes which are cooperators increases the
founders’ scores, whilst the newly added cooperators score
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Figure 3: The effect of network model on the relationship
between temptation to defect and cooperation. Each line is
the average of 10 replicate simulations. Simulations featured
1000 nodes and were run for 2000 generations. Non-attrition
models achieved fixed network structure after 100 genera-
tions beyond which strategy updating continued alone. At-
trition implementations (EPA+ & CRA+) are represented
with dashed lines.
zero. Added defectors score zero and only add to the mass
of defectors present. In summary, nodes initially added to a
defector-founded network score zero, regardless of strategy.
The interactions within these networks are complex and
subject to random events. Outcomes are not assured, how-
ever we see that for defector-founded networks, relative
score differences will create a high scoring founder network
with newcomers unable to score. Whereas in a cooperator-
founded network, scores will be relatively similar between
newcomers and existing nodes, in defector-founded net-
works, we see a disparity in scores which causes an initial
bias against cooperation. Cooperators in this situation are
likely to be converted to defectors. Preferential attachment,
by definition, drives new nodes to connect to the higher scor-
ing founder members. It therefore promotes the disparity in
scores and reduces the likelihood of new nodes attaching to
non-founders, although it does not eliminate the possibility.
(The bias against cooperation that we have described can be
overcome in the less probable situation where new coopera-
tor nodes connect to other cooperator nodes rather than the
initial defector founders.)
We now refocus on the initial question of why CRA is able
to support cooperation from defector-founded networks to a
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Figure 4: Initial interactions between founder networks and
added nodes for a) cooperator- and b) defector-founded net-
works. Blue circles represent cooperators. Red triangles
represent defectors. Interaction payoffs are shown along
edges. Cumulative scores are shown within nodes. Founder
networks are shown in bold.
greater extent than EPA. In CRA, by definition, new nodes
are connected randomly. Unlike EPA, high scoring defector-
founder networks have no enhanced ability to preferentially
attract newly added cooperators (and then convert them to
defectors). Without this ‘pull’ of new node connections to
the defector founders, alternative interconnected groups can
form, which would be more likely to support cooperation.
We note, in terms of asymptotic outcomes for CRA
networks, that given random attachment of new nodes, the
greater the number of nodes in the network the smaller is
the influence of the founders. This situation is clearly very
different to EPA where early nodes are likely to develop
into influential hubs. Specifically for EPA simulations,
in the case where defectors found a population, we see
the interesting result that the “rich get richer” effect is
detrimental to the interests of cooperators.
How does attrition change outcomes for these models?
We see from Figure 3 that when the network models in-
corporate repeated attrition of least fit members (see dashed
lines) cooperation is promoted, regardless of founder popu-
lation strategy type. Attrition increases cooperation for both
network formation models and reduces dependence on ini-
tial conditions. In direct comparisons, EPA with attrition
achieves higher levels of cooperation than CRA with attri-
tion.
In the case of EPA, we know that the network structure
becomes fixed (by generation 100 in our simulations), and
any increase in cooperation thereafter is due to strategy up-
dating. When attrition is added to the model, cooperation
increases, implying that the early fixation of network struc-
ture limits achievable levels of cooperation. The attrition
model effectively removes this limit and allows the network
to continually restructure simultaneously with strategy re-
distribution. Specifically, it has been postulated in (Miller
and Knowles, 2014) that random events during the earliest
stages of a network’s formation can have long-term conse-
quences for cooperation. We have illustrated one example
of how such effects may arise in Figure 4. Given structural
fixation, such consequences are ‘locked-in’. Attrition allows
for some opportunity to ‘unlock’ the structure.
More generally, for both CRA and EPA models, attrition
targets low fitness nodes. We can estimate some informa-
tion about the type of strategies and the connectivity of such
low fitness nodes. They are likely to be: i) defectors amidst
a ‘sea’ of other defector nodes (D-D payoffs are 0, 0), or
ii) marginalised defectors with degree k = 1 (‘terminal
nodes’), connected to one other defector. We note that low
degree cooperators connected to defectors are unlikely to be
evolutionarily stable: their strategies would be displaced by
defection.
It seems that attrition, by focusing on least fit members
of the population, eliminates defector occupied nodes.
Replacement strategies however will then be either cooper-
ators or defectors with equal probability, and the nodes they
occupy may also reattach to more opportune positions in
the network.
Does attrition change the topology of the CRA networks?
We show in Figure 5 that CRA+attrition does not result in
a different type of degree distribution to CRA: there is no
increase in the range of degree values. If anything, for very
high values of b, the opposite is true: heterogeneity of degree
is reduced for the attrition networks. The reduced frequency
of higher degree nodes is explained by the fact that for high
values of b the simulation will be entirely overrun by defec-
tors so most agents will achieve scores of zero, regardless of
degree. Given the uniformity of fitness values presented by
this scenario, attrition becomes a random process rather than
specifically being biased towards low fitness. Note that the
presence of nodes of degree k = 1 in the Figure is an arte-
fact caused by the attrition process (deletion of some nodes
occasionally leaves other residual nodes of degree k = 1 in
the network).
Conclusions
We have demonstrated a model, featuring network growth
by a random process, which supports network-reciprocal co-
operation. The key to cooperation in our model is the mech-
anism of assortativity which allows agents in the simulation
to capitalise on the exponential degree distribution of the
network such that cooperators can form groups which serve
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Figure 5: Degree distributions for networks formed using
CRA vs. CRA+attrition for low and high temptation to de-
fect (b) values. a) shows results for networks grown from
cooperator founders and b) for defector founders. Observed
range of degree values is shown within each plot.
to elevate the rewards available to them. Assortativity is pro-
moted by the evolutionary attrition process included within
our model whereby less fit nodes are deleted.
We find that our model of chronological random attach-
ment with fitness-based attrition (CRA+), supports levels of
cooperation equivalent to or greater than an existing coevo-
lutionary method based on preferential attachment (EPA).
Our model does not require that agents have memory or
higher cognitive abilities and it supports cooperation, re-
gardless of the behaviours initially present amongst the
founding members of the population. Importantly, the model
supports cooperation without the requirement for agents to
have any form of global knowledge regarding either the net-
work or other members of the population. Given random
linking of new nodes, there is also no requirement to explain
a mechanism for preferential attachment.
Our minimal model points to a possible general expla-
nation applicable to the emergence of cooperation in net-
works of primitive individuals. The requirements are that
new nodes are added over time to an existing network, and
that cooperative behaviours which increase the fitness of in-
dividuals have a tendency to persist over less beneficial be-
haviours — the latter being eliminated by evolutionary se-
lection.
We have found in comparing these models of network
growth that network-reciprocal cooperation can exist with-
out the level of degree heterogeneity associated with scale-
free structure. Such findings at first glance appear some-
what at odds with the prevailing consensus that increasing
heterogeneity promotes cooperation; however by explicitly
considering the benefits to cooperation offered by the com-
bined effects of heterogeneity and assortativity, we can shed
a different light on our results. Whilst our model clearly in-
troduces only a very limited form of heterogeneity in terms
of the network structure, our findings allow for the possi-
bility that, with regards to cooperation, it is more benefi-
cial that cooperators can maximise a non-homogeneous self-
assortative strategy distribution, than the network structure
itself be highly heterogeneous.
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